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Abstract: In this paper, we investigate the diachronic fittingness conditions of
admiration – that is, what it takes for a person to continue or cease to be
admirable over time. We present a series of cases that elicit judgements that sug-
gest different understandings of admiration over time. In some cases, admirability
seems to last forever. In other cases, it seems that it can cease within a person’s
lifetime if she changes sufficiently. Taken together, these cases highlight what
we call the puzzle of admiration over time. We then present a potential solution
to this puzzle.
1. Introduction
Walking through an art gallery, we might admire the beautiful paintings it
contains. Attending a political rally, wemight admire its courageous leaders.
Thinking about a foe, we might find ourselves admiring their tenacity
despite our animosity towards them. We also admire people for the actions
they perform. Such agential admiration is our focus in this paper. More
specifically, we are concerned with accounting for admiration over time
for actions – that is, the conditions under which a person who is admirable
for A‐ing at t1 remains or ceases to be admirable for A‐ing at t2.
One reason we focus on admiration for actions is that admiration over
time for traits seems to be a simple matter. If a person is admirable at t1
for having courage but she no longer has courage at t2, then at t2, she is no
longer admirable for having courage. After all, she ceases to possess that
which made her admirable – her courage – and so she ceases to be admirable
for that. It remains the case that she was admirable and so we could admire
the kind of person she was (i.e., her earlier self), but because she is no longer
admirable, we cannot admire the kind of person she now is (i.e., her current
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self). However, the fact that an action has been performed cannot be undone
by the passage of time. If a person performs an admirable act at t1, then it
will always be true that she did something admirable at t1 no matter what
happens in the future. So it might seem that a person being admirable for
an action also cannot be undone.
In Section 2, however, we consider a case in which a person seems to cease
being admirable for actions she was admirable for earlier. We then consider
another case that seems to suggest we cannot cease being admirable for
actions we were previously admirable for. These two cases highlight a puz-
zle. Why is it that admirability for actions sometimes persists and sometimes
does not? The rest of the paper attempts to solve this puzzle. In Section 3, we
consider whether distinguishing between moral and non‐moral admiration
can solve this puzzle. While this does provide a way of accommodating
the conflicting judgements elicited by the cases we consider in Section 2,
we then consider two more cases that undermine this proposal. In Section 4,
we outline our solution to this puzzle, according to which a person ceases
being admirable for a past action when she performs an action or series of
actions that function as defeaters for the earlier actions for which she was
once admirable.
2. The puzzle of admiration over time
Aung San Suu Kyi is the de facto civilian leader of Myanmar (formerly
Burma), considered by some to be Asia’s equivalent to Nelson Mandela,
‘a picture of grace and moral authority’ for championing democracy and
opposing ‘the brutal military junta that long dominated Burmese politics’
(Tharoor 2017). In 1991, she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize ‘for her
non‐violent struggle for democracy and human rights’ (The Nobel Peace
Prize 1991) against themilitary powers that controlled Burma. She then used
the prize money from her Nobel Peace Prize to create a health and education
trust for the Burmese people (Miller 2001, p. 21). Suu Kyi seems clearly
admirable for such morally excellent acts. Moreover, it seems that she
manifests virtuous traits in these acts.
Suu Kyi has, however, recently come under moral scrutiny for not speak-
ing out against the genocide perpetrated by her country’s army against the
long persecuted Rohingya people. The United Nations (2017) issued a
report detailing widespread and systemic violence and rape, ‘indicating the
very likely commission of crimes against humanity’. Hasan (2017) describes
Suu Kyi as, ‘an apologist for genocide, ethnic cleansing and mass rape’. It
seems to many that Suu Kyi is no longer a fitting target of admiration for
her earlier acts. She has already had some of her honours withdrawn – such
as a human rights award from the United States Holocaust Memorial
Museum (Schwirtz 2018). Some have even called for her Nobel Peace Prize
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to be revoked because ‘she no longer deserves it’ (Monbiot 2017). She has
also had her honorary Canadian citizenship removedwith one commentator
saying, ‘She was a saint, now she’s not, so we’re taking back our gong’
(Potter 2018).
Given that SuuKyi’s case is a real‐life one, it seems open to different inter-
pretations. We might think that at some point she became a different
person.1 Or we might think that Suu Kyi was never in fact admirable but
rather just appeared to be. While her earlier acts gave us evidence that she
manifested virtues in her acts and so was admirable for those acts, her later
acts give us evidence that she never in fact possessed virtues and so was never
admirable. We do not wish to argue about the correct interpretation of this
case. We think the more interesting interpretation is one according to which
Suu Kyi remains the same person and genuinely changes. Let us suppose,
then, that at t1 she is genuinely admirable for many morally excellent acts
but that by t2 she became an apologist for genocide, ethnic cleansing and
rape. Such cases seem possible, even if they may not in fact be the case for
the real‐life Suu Kyi. Henceforth, we refer to this case as ‘Fallen Hero’ to
make clear stipulations are being made about it. Given this understanding
of her case, does she remain admirable for her earlier acts after having
become an apologist for genocide, ethnic cleansing and rape?
It seems most plausible to us that she does not remain admirable for her
earlier acts. This does not mean that her earlier self ceases to be admirable
for performing those acts. Indeed, we might still admire her earlier self – just
as might admire a painting before it is badly restored. We might think back
to the earlier Fallen Hero with the positive feeling or judgement that is typ-
ical of admiration (Archer 2019, p. 146; Ben‐Ze’ev 2001, p. 56).What we are
concerned with is the admirability of her later self for her earlier acts, and it
seems clear that her later self is not admirable for her earlier acts. And while
we might also judge that she is not an overall admirable person because of
her later acts, it seems clear that we also judge that she is no longer admirable
for her earlier acts.
Why does she cease being admirable for her earlier acts? One possibility is
that a person ceases being admirable for A‐ing if she ceases to possess the
traits that were essential to her being admirable for A‐ing in the first place.
After all, part of what made Fallen Hero admirable for her actions is that
those actions manifested her virtuous traits. Her later acts imply that she
no longer possesses those virtuous traits. Her ceasing to possess those traits
may therefore explain why she ceases being admirable for her earlier acts.
Call this the trait account of admiration over time.2 We will now consider
a case that undermines this account. This is the case of the ‘Athletic Hero
Past his Prime’.
Consider Pelé, Brazil’s widely admired footballing hero. When he was in
his prime, he performed all sorts of athletic acts for which he merited admi-
ration. Among these was an artful flick over a defender’s head just outside
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the six‐yard box before he fired the ball past the goalkeeper in a 5–2 win over
Sweden at the 1958 World Cup. Sigge Parling, one of his opponents in that
game, said later, ‘After the fifth goal, even I wanted to cheer for him’
(Fifa.com 2010). During his career, Pelé won many awards and accolades
– all of which at least pick him out as being admirable for his footballing
feats – including being awarded the Ballon d’Or (the award for the world’s
best player) seven times.
Pelé retired from football in 1977. Since then, he has continued to receive
awards and accolades. Amongmany others, in 1999, he was named ‘Athlete
of the Century’ by the International Olympic Committee; in 2000, he
received FIFA’s Player of the Century award; and in 2013, he received
FIFA’s Ballon d’Or Prix d’honneur. He is also regularly praised by others.
In awarding Pelé the first Laureus Lifetime Achievement Award,
Mandela (2010) said that the award is given to ‘a world athlete who
exemplifies the highest virtue of sport, honour, courage, joy and
perseverance’ and that Pelé is ‘an enduring model for all athletes. In fact,
for all of us, to admire and emulate’.
Part of what made Pelé admirable for his footballing feats were his athletic
traits (which includes his talents), such as his goal scoring ability, his touch,
his passing ability and his ability, in the words of Johann Cruyff, to ‘surpass
the bounds of logic’ (Fifa.com 2010). Because he has grown older, these
traits have declined to the point that he no longer possesses them. This exam-
ple cuts against the trait account according to which remaining admirable
for past actions requires that one continues to possess the traits that were
essential to becoming admirable for those actions. The problem with this
account is that it implies that Pelé, once he loses his athletic traits, ceases
being admirable for his earlier athletic feats just as Fallen Hero ceases being
admirable for her earlier moral acts. But this seems counter‐intuitive in
Pelé’s case. It would mean that all the awards given to him, as well as all
the feelings and verbal expressions of admiration by his peers and others
after he lost those traits, were unmerited. And this seems to be the wrong
result. It is not just that he continues to receive awards and accolades, it
seems that he remains a fitting target of admiration for his earlier acts.
Perhaps it is the case that it is his earlier self – that is, Pelé when he still pos-
sessed the relevant athletic traits – that is the target of some of these awards
and other expressions of admiration. But it seems that many of them target
the man as he now is – namely, an old man incapable of the feats that made
him an athletic icon. So it seems implausible to say that it is only his earlier
self that is the target of all these varied expressions of admiration. It remains
counter‐intuitive that Pelé does not remain admirable for his earlier
footballing feats.
The two cases we have considered so far highlight a puzzle, which we call
the puzzle of admiration over time. Sometimes admiration persists, and some-
times admiration ceases. The Fallen Hero case suggests that admirability
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may eventually cease over time. The Athletic Hero case suggests otherwise.
Our judgements therefore seem to conflict. In some cases, people continue to
be admirable for their past actions even when they lose the relevant traits,
and in other cases, people seem to cease being admirable when they lose
the relevant traits. How can we explain this?
One way would be to argue that one of the judgements is mistaken.
Perhaps we should think that Fallen Hero never ceases being admirable,
or perhaps we should think Pelé does in fact cease being admirable. It is
possible that we could be systematically mistaken or irrational and one of
the judgements is mistaken. However, rather than try to debunk one of the
judgements, we will instead try to give a vindicating explanation of both
judgements. We will try to account for these judgements within a unified
account of admiration over time.
3. Solution one: Moral versus non‐moral admiration
Is there something about moral admiration that leads people to say that
admiration is no longer fitting for past actions, even though we think that
admiration of past non‐moral actions is fitting? Perhaps there is something
significantly different about morality such that the grounds for admirability
located within this normative domain differ from the grounds for admirabil-
ity located in non‐moral normative domains. The non‐moral case suggests
that a change in underlying traits does notmake a difference to one’s admi-
rability. Because all that seems to matter is that one once possessed the rele-
vant traits, this suggests that non‐moral admiration involves a diachronic
evaluation – that is, an evaluation that takes into consideration the traits
that a person has possessed at any point in her life so far. Themoral case sug-
gests that a change in traits does make a difference to one’s admirability.
This suggests that moral admiration involves a synchronic evaluation – that
is, an evaluation that takes into consideration what traits a person now pos-
sesses. Call this the evaluation pluralist account.
If the evaluation pluralist account is correct, then we have a way to resolve
the conflict created by the two cases we have considered so far. It would ex-
plain why we find Fallen Hero to no longer be admirable for her earlier acts
and why we find Athletic Hero to continue to be admirable for his earlier
acts. Because moral admiration involves a synchronic evaluation and
non‐moral admiration does not, it makes sense that our evaluation of Fallen
Hero is sensitive to the loss of moral virtue in a way that our evaluation Ath-
letic Hero is not sensitive to the loss of athletic talent.
However, this account is also inadequate. There are cases of people who
seem to cease being non‐morally admirable, and there are cases of people
who seem to continue being morally admirable despite losing the traits that
made them admirable in the first place. Let us consider these cases in turn.
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Sell Out Artist: Fraser is an artist who was considered by critics to be at
the forefront of a counter‐cultural movement at the beginning of his career.
At that time, he created exciting and marvellous works. He won many
awards and received admiration for his work from around the globe. Some
critics singled out his aesthetic traits, such as his talent and creativity, as a
source of his admirability. But over the last few years, Fraser has started pro-
ducing works that seem trite and boring. He seems to have lost any talent
that he once had and is no longer producing the exciting works he once
did. Rather, he is producing works that aim at making him money rather
than trying to inspire and marvel his audience. Some critics remark that he
is undoing the credibility that he took years to build up.
Former War Hero:During the SecondWorld War, Sofia risked her life to
save thousands fromNazi death camps. She regularly did what was difficult
for her to do, sacrificed her personal safety and wealth and in general went
above and beyond the call of duty. She manifested virtuous traits – such as
courage and beneficence – in her actions. Indeed, the fact she possessed such
traits was essential to her acting as she did. After the war, she has no oppor-
tunities to express these traits for over 30 years. Because over those 30 years
the traits that made her virtuous have not been used, those traits have weak-
ened to the point that she no longer possesses them. While she was once
inclined to do what was difficult for her and to sacrifice her safety and
wealth, she is now no longer inclined to do more than what is required of
her. Importantly, however, she has not become a vicious person; she simply
lives a quiet and peaceful life.
In Sell Out Artist, it seems that Fraser ceases being admirable for his ear-
lier works. This does not change the fact that his earlier self was admirable
for those works. We might still think back to the ‘early’ Fraser and feel
admiration for him then. But because the ‘later’ Fraser seems to ‘undo’ (in
some sense) his earlier works, he no longer seems to be a fitting target of
admiration for those works.3
In Former War Hero, it seems that Sofia remains admirable for her
wartime actions despite the fact that she ceases to possess the traits that were
essential to her becoming admirable. It seems relevant that Sofia has not
become a vicious person. In contrast with Fraser, she has not done anything
that ‘undoes’ her earlier admirable acts.
The evaluation pluralist account is unable to accommodate these further
judgements. It implies that Fraser remains admirable for his earlier works
despite his change in artistic character, and it implies that Sofia ceases being
admirable because of her change in moral character. And yet it seems that
Fraser ceases to be admirable and that Sofia continues to be admirable. In
other words, it seems that sometimesmoral admirability persists even though
the traits that were essential to the person becoming admirable no longer
persist, and it seems that sometimes non‐moral admirability ceases when
the person loses the relevant traits. Therefore, the evaluation pluralist
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account fails. The puzzle remains: why is it that admirability sometimes
persists and sometimes does not?
4. Our solution: Admiration and defeaters
We propose that admirability must be undone or defeated in order for a per-
son to cease being admirable. We will propose that defeaters make a person
an unfitting target of admiration for an earlier action because they imply
that the person violates the ideal that made them admirable in the first place.
The first component of this understanding, then, is that ideals ground admi-
ration for actions. We will propose that a person becomes admirable for an
action when in so acting she manifests an ideal to some extent. For example,
FallenHero’s morally excellent acts manifest an ideal of a social justice cam-
paigner, and Athletic Hero’s feats manifest an ideal of a footballer. The
second component is that ideals have a temporal component with a
narrative structure. We will propose that a person remains admirable to
the extent that she does not violate the ideal that made her admirable
in the first place, where ‘violating an ideal’means that a person acts outside
the range of narratives associated with an ideal. After outlining andmotivat-
ing these two components, we will show how our narrative account of
admiration solves the puzzle of admiration over time.
4.1. ADMIRATION AND IDEALS
To see the connection between admiration and ideals, we will first need to
say more about admiration itself. We think admiration can take a variety
of intentional objects, such as animals, flowers and sunsets. Our focus,
though, is on agential admiration – that is, admiration directed towards a
person who is capable of acting for reasons (Shoemaker 2015, p. 38), and
in particular, on admiration for a person for acting in a particular way. It
is therefore important to distinguish between the two intentional objects of
such admiration. As with many emotions, we can distinguish such admira-
tion’s formal object and its particular object (Scarantino and de Sousa 2018;
Kauppinen 2019). The former is what makes the emotion fitting, whereas
the latter is the target of the emotion. With respect to admiration for a per-
son for acting a particular way, the particular object is the person. That is, it
is the person whom we admire for acting a particular way.
Given the apparent connection between admiration and excellent acts, we
might think that actions are admiration’s formal object. That is, whether
admiration is fitting depends on the nature of the action. However, this does
not seem right, at least when it comes to agential admiration. Merely doing
something excellent does not make one a fitting target of admiration
(Kauppinen 2019, pp. 32–33; Wolf 2016). Suppose someone performs an
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excellent action accidentally. For example, a footballer may score a beauti-
ful goal when she in fact intended to pass the ball rather than shoot. The goal
itself may be admirable in the same way a beautiful sunset or cloud forma-
tion may be admirable. The player, though, is not a fitting target of admira-
tion, as this goal is not creditable to her in any meaningful way. Similarly,
someone who performs morally virtuous acts but for the wrong reasons,
for example, out of a desire to impress people, is not admirable. However
excellent the act may be, agential admiration would not be fitting, as the per-
son performing the act would not be praiseworthy.
This suggests that in order for a person to be admirable for performing an
action, she must have performed it intentionally and for the right reasons. If
we only needed to explain how a person initially becomes admirable, this
might have been an adequate account. But because we also need to explain
admiration over time, this account is lacking. Aswe saw in Section 2, the fact
that a person is admirable for an action at t1 does not guarantee that she will
be admirable for that action at t2.
What is needed then in order to remain admirable for our past actions?
One plausible answer is that these actions must reflect something about
who we are. David Shoemaker’s account that admiration targets traits pro-
vides a way to make sense of this. Shoemaker (2015, p. 56) claims that,
‘Agential admiration has as its fitting object character traits, evaluating
them as excellent relative to some ideal.’ If we think that agential admiration
takes character traits as its formal object, then it makes sense to think that
what is needed to remain admirable for an earlier action is continued posses-
sion of the traits that led to that action. However, as we saw in Section 2, the
trait account of admiration over time cannot solve the puzzle. While this
account can explain why Fallen Hero ceases to be admirable, it cannot
explain why Athletic Hero remains admirable.
Antti Kauppinen’s (2019) person‐focused account of admiration poten-
tially offers an answer to this question. According to Kauppinen (2019, p.
36), a person‐focused attitude is one that is directed towards a person
as ‘an enduring constellation of traits and attitudes.’ According to
Kauppinen (2019, p. 32), the target of admiration, ‘is a person, who is con-
strued as leading a life manifesting (or approximating) an ideal of the person
we endorse.’ A natural way to extend this account to cover admirability for
past actions is to say that a person remains admirable for a past action if she
continues tomanifest the relevant ideal of a person that shemanifested when
she performed that action. However, if continuing to manifest the relevant
ideal necessarily involves possessing the constellation of traits and attitudes
that were essential to one being admirable in the first place, then this account
fails for the same reason as Shoemaker’s. While it gets the right result in
Fallen Hero, it gets the wrong result in Athletic Hero.
While neither of these accounts is able to solve the puzzle, both contain an
idea that will be key to our solution. According to both accounts, when we
PACIFIC PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY676
©2020 The Author
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2020 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
admire someone, we construe them as excellent in relation to an ideal – that
is, we view them as manifesting an ideal to some extent.
4.2. THE NATURE OF IDEALS
According toKimberley Brownlee (2010, p. 242), ideals ‘aremodels of excel-
lence or conceptions of perfection around which we can orient our thoughts
and conduct.’ Some ideals are related to social roles, such as ideals related to
being a teacher (Kauppinen 2019, p. 41). Such ideals are models of excel-
lence or perfection in particular roles. An ideal of a teacher may involve a
teacher caring for her students, being patient, being hard‐working, being
conscientious and so on. There may in fact be a number of different ideals
related to being a teacher. One ideal of a teacher might require being dedi-
cated, hard‐working and caring, whereas another ideal of a teacher might
require being charismatic and inspirational.
We might worry that linking admiration to ideals makes it unlikely that
anyone will ever be a fitting target of admiration. However, manifesting
an ideal is something that can be done in degrees (Kauppinen 2019, p. 41).
So fitting admiration need not be uncommon. On our view, the extent to
which a person manifests an ideal when she acts determines the extent to
which she is admirable for that action. This fits with the idea that some peo-
ple can be more or less admirable than other people.
Because there are many different ideals, there is a range of different ways
to manifest ideals. Consequently, there are many different ways of being
admirable. Compare an ideal of being a teacher with an ideal of being a sol-
dier. An ideal of the latter may place more importance on the virtue of cour-
age than on the virtue of kindness or compassion.An ideal of being a teacher,
on the other hand, may give more emphasis to kindness or patience.
As well as influencing which traits are prioritised, different ideals also
seem to require that traits are instantiated in different ways. For example,
the ideals associated with being a soldier and being a footballer both seem
to involve the virtue of courage, but the relevant sense of courage differs
between these ideals. A soldier may have to be willing to risk her life in order
to be courageous, whereas a footballer need not do so. A footballer may
only need to be willing to suffer career‐ending (but not life‐ending) injuries.
So while ideals of both footballers and soldiers prescribe facing dangers, the
dangers they prescribe are of a different kind.4
Given the variety of ideals, it is possible that a person manifests one ideal
while failing to manifest another ideal that is relevant to her life
(Kauppinen 2019, p. 41). For example, a person who is both a teacher and
a parent might manifest an ideal of a teacher but might fail to manifest
any ideal of a parent. Her failing as a parent need not affect the fact that
she manifests an ideal of a teacher.
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4.3. IDEALS AND NARRATIVES
At this stage, we take ourselves to have made a good case for the first com-
ponent of our view – namely, that ideals ground agential admiration. In
other words, a person becomes admirable for an action to the extent that
she manifests an ideal in so acting. In order to solve the puzzle of admiration
over time, we must also give an account of remaining admirable. The
account wewill now propose holds that ideals are associated with narratives.
We will suggest that the fittingness of admiration over time depends on not
‘violating’ the particular ideal the manifestation of which makes a person
admirable for her actions in the first place, where violating an ideal
means that the person acts outside the range of narratives associated with
an ideal.
Our starting point is David Velleman’s (1991) claim that the value of one’s
overall life may be different from the total momentary value of one’s life: if
we add up all the moments of well‐being in two lives, they may come out
equal and yet one person’s life is better overall. Consider two lives:
One life begins in the depths but takes an upward trend: a childhood of deprivation, a troubled
youth, struggles and setbacks in early adulthood, followed finally by success and satisfaction in
middle age and a peaceful retirement. Another life begins at the heights but slides downhill: a
blissful childhood and youth, precocious triumphs and rewards in early adulthood, followed
by a midlife strewn with disasters that lead tomisery in old age. Surely, we can imagine two such
lives as containing equal sums of momentary well being. Your retirement is as blessed in one life
as your childhood is in the other; your nonage is as blighted in one life as your dotage is in the
other. (Velleman 1991, pp. 49–50)
It seems that the first life is better overall than the second life. The explana-
tion for this is that a life’s value is not additive – that is, it is not just about
adding up individual moments of well‐being. Rather, a life’s value depends
on its overall shape, where thatmeans it fits a particular narrative. Lives that
start well but end badly are not as good as lives that start badly but end well,
as the example suggests. This is because the latter sorts of lives are better
stories than the former sorts of lives.
Velleman’s view will serve as a useful point of comparison in outlining
our account of remaining admirable. One point of similarity is that
Velleman stresses the distinction between well‐being at a particular time
and a life’s overall value, while we distinguish between becoming and
remaining admirable. In other words, we both allow that the target
phenomenon may apply to a person in the past (well‐being and being
admirable), but that the question we are interested in is about the per-
son’s present instantiation of the phenomenon. As we noted earlier, when
a person ceases being admirable, it remains the case that her earlier self
was admirable (we cannot change the past after all). But a person’s
behaviour over time can change what those earlier actions mean for
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her present admirability for those earlier actions. As Velleman (1991,
pp. 52–53) says about the value of a life, ‘later events are thought to alter
the meaning of earlier events, thereby altering their contribution to the
value of one’s life’.
The key point of similarity is that we think that the fittingness of admira-
tion over time depends on how one’s life goes in the same kind of way that
Velleman proposes that the value of one’s life depends on the narrative shape
of one’s overall life (according to which good lives end well, and bad lives
end badly). This is not to say that there is a connection between the value
of one’s life and whether one is admirable. A person could remain admirable
despite her life not going well. For example, the ideal of the struggling artist
who sacrifices her happiness and even her health for the sake of her art
involves the artist’s life not goingwell. And neither does itmean that remain-
ing admirable depends on the same kind of narrative shape that the value of
a life does. Remaining admirable is less about living a certain sort of life and
rather about not living a certain sort of life. In our view, a person remains a
fitting target of admiration for an action to the extent that she does not vio-
late the relevant ideals, where violating an ideal means that a person acts
outside the range of narratives associated with an ideal.5
Why think that narratives are associated with ideals? We suggest that it
is because we use ideals as guides to action. According to Linda
Zagzebski (2017), admiration involves a desire to emulate the target of admi-
ration.When we admire a person, we try to be like them. If our admiration is
fitting, then our target must be worthy of emulation. When a person is not
worthy of emulation in a particular respect, she is not admirable in that
respect. Consider Fallen Hero. While her earlier self is someone we would
say was worthy of emulation, her later self is clearly not worthy of emula-
tion. This accords with our judgement that her later self is not admirable
for her earlier actions. Because she ceases to meet the ideal of a social justice
campaigner, she ceases being admirable.
However, ideals considered at a particular time only provide a partial
guide to action. We do not just need to know how to act in particular
moments but also how to excel in particular roles over time. Building on
the work of AlasdairMacIntyre, Paul Ricoeur (1992) argues that a narrative
understanding of ideals is needed to make sense of the claim that ideals can
provide guidance on how to live. In his words:
If stories told offer so many bases for moral judgement, is this not because this judgement needs
the art of storytelling in order to schematize, as it were, its aim? Beyond the rules, norms, obli-
gations, and legislating that constitute what can be called morality, there is, as we shall state
then, the aim of the true life, which MacIntyre, echoing Aristotle, places at the summit of the
hierarchy of the levels of praxis. Now if this aim is to become a vision, it cannot help but be
depicted in the narratives through which we try out different courses of action by playing, in
the strong sense of the word, with competing possibilities. (1992, p. 164, fn. 31)
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We take from this that it is the narrative structure of ideals that make them
useful for planning our future actions and so useful for figuring out how we
are going to live.When we emulate someone that we admire, we are in effect
trying to manifest the ideal that we have identified them as having mani-
fested. By acknowledging that narratives are associated with ideals, we can
see why ideals give us both guidance for what to do at particular times
and for what to do over time. They tell us not only what we ought to do
now but also what we ought to do later. Because we use ideals to guide us,
we should therefore think that they are associated with narratives.
4.4. VIOLATING IDEALS
We have argued that ideals are associated with narratives. We will now
explain what we take violating an ideal to mean.
The most obvious a way a person does not violate an ideal is if she con-
tinues to manifest the ideal over time. Consider Full Hero. This is a person
who maximally manifests an ideal (e.g., of a social justice campaigner) and
then continues to maximally manifest that ideal throughout her entire life.
Full Hero becomes as admirable as a person can and then continues to be
fully admirable throughout her life. Call this the ideal narrative associated
with an ideal. It is a role‐specific story in which a person not only maximally
manifests an ideal at one time but also continues tomanifest that ideal to the
same extent over time.
While a person must manifest an ideal at a particular time to some extent
to become admirable, a person need not continue to manifest an ideal over
time to continue being admirable. This is because ideals are associated with
a range of narratives and not just an ideal narrative (there may even be mul-
tiple ideal narratives for a particular ideal). To see this, consider Retired
Hero. This is a person who is admirable for promoting social justice but then
retires from public life. While she does not continue to manifest the ideal
narrative of a campaigner for social justice, she does not act in a way that
violates the ideal she earlier manifested. We might say that she infringes
the ideal because it seems that RetiredHero is less admirable thanFullHero.
But it does not seem that Retired Hero ceases to be admirable.
The reason that ideals are associated with a range of narratives is related
to the motivational component of admiration. As we discussed in
Section 4.3, those who are admirable are worthy of emulation. While
Retired Hero is worthy of emulation for her excellent acts, she is not as wor-
thy of emulation as Full Hero (at least qua social justice campaigner) for her
excellent acts. While both perform (we can suppose) equally excellent
actions, Full Hero is more worthy of emulation because she continues to
maximallymanifest the ideal of a social justice campaigner. Even so, Retired
Hero is still a good exemplar of a social justice campaigner. While Retired
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Hero’s story would not end in the best way for a social justice campaigner –
she would not be fighting for social justice until her very last breath as Full
Hero does – it would not be a bad end to her story qua social justice cam-
paigner. It does not end badly because looking at Retired Hero’s full story
as a social justice campaigner still gives us good guidance on how to be a so-
cial justice campaigner at one time and over time.
The same is not true, though, for Fallen Hero. While her earlier self is a
good exemplar, she – with her actions in her role as a social justice cam-
paigner taken as a whole – is not a good example to follow. Her later actions
(condoning genocide) violate the ideal of social justice campaigner because
they render her present self not worthy of emulation in her role as a social
justice campaigner. As discussed, when we admire someone for what she
does, we seek not only guidance on how to act at particular times but also
over time. Part of what makes her admirable is that she is worthy of emula-
tion, and whether she continues to be admirable depends in part on whether
she continues to be worthy of emulation. As we have argued, because of this
link between admiration and emulation, it matters how a person’s story turn
outs. Fallen Hero’s story goes badly because of how she changes, and so she
violates the ideal of a social justice campaigner.
Let us now consider Former War Hero. She continues to be admirable
despite losing the traits that were essential to her being admirable in the first
place. If her actions had not expressed those virtuous traits, then she would
not have manifested an ideal of a war hero. While she may not continue to
manifest this ideal over time (because she loses the relevant traits), she still
does not act in a way that makes her not worthy of emulation for her earlier
acts. It is true that she is less admirable than Retired Hero. While Retired
Hero no longer manifests the ideal of a social justice campaigner, she con-
tinues to possess the traits that were essential to her meeting this ideal. A per-
son is more worthy of emulation if she continues to possess the traits that
were essential to her meeting the relevant ideal in the first place. But losing
those traits, as is the case with FormerWar Hero, does not necessarily mean
that one ceases to be worthy of emulation. Because Former War Hero does
not become morally vicious – that is, she does not become akin to Fallen
Hero – she is still worthy of emulation to some extent. Again, she is not
now as worthy of emulation for her earlier actions as Retired Hero (and
so not as worthy as Full Hero), but she has not yet crossed the line into being
unworthy of admiration.
Narratives associated withmoral ideals range from continuing tomanifest
the relevant ideal (as is the case with Full Hero) to no longer manifesting the
relevant ideal because one ceases to possess the relevant essential traits (as is
the case with Former War Hero). It seems that the former is the upper limit
and the latter is the lower limit of narratives associated with moral ideals.
FallenHero’s narrative is below the lower limit – she does more than just fail
to manifest the relevant ideal (more on this shortly) – so she counts as
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violating the ideal. Importantly, the fact that a person fails to manifest the
ideal after initially manifesting it does not necessarily affect whether she vi-
olates the ideal. Former War Hero, for example, fails to manifest the ideal
after the war because her actions no longer manifest the relevant virtuous
traits (because she loses them). While she fails to manifest an ideal of war
hero later in life, she is still a good (if far from the best) example to follow.
Let us now consider Athletic Hero. Nothing about his later actions or loss
of ability seems to cut against him remaining admirable for his footballing
feats. We can explain this as follows. It is within the range of acceptable nar-
ratives associated with the athletic ideals that one can stop being excellent at
sports and yet still remain admirable. This is after all what normally happens
with footballers. They play for 10–15 years, and then they retire. It may be
true that Full Athletic Hero (a person just like Full Hero but whomaximally
manifests an athletic ideal rather than a moral one) is more admirable than
Athletic Hero, but that does not mean that Athletic Hero ceases being admi-
rable for his earlier feats. One difference between Former War Hero and
Athletic Hero is that it seems that Athletic Hero’s story is closer to the rele-
vant ideal narrative than Former War Hero’s. Even though Full Athletic
Hero may be more admirable than Athletic Hero, it does not seem that ath-
letes lose as much admirability by losing their traits. This is perhaps because
it would be asking too much if the narratives closer to the ideal narrative of
an athletic hero involved always being at the top of one’s game throughout
one’s life.
This is not to say that an athlete necessarily remains admirable once she
becomes admirable. If Athletic Hero had become a terrible footballer while
he was active as a footballer – perhaps he stopped training as much and got
out of shape – it seems possible that this could have undermined his admira-
bility for his earlier athletic feats. This is the way inwhich an athlete can ‘fall’
comparable with how a moral hero (such as Fallen Hero) can fall. So
becoming terrible while active violates the range of acceptable narratives,
whereas it is an acceptable narrative for athletes to retire and then be bad
at their sport. Athletic Hero might fail to manifest the ideal – for example,
by playing the game badly at a non‐professional level – but that does not
mean that he violates the ideal. Again, failure to manifest an ideal is not
sufficient for violating that ideal. Because Athletic Hero retired before he
became a bad footballer, his later actions are in line with the range of narra-
tives associated with being an athletic hero. Hence, his admirability is not
defeated.
As we have seen, there are not exact parallels between the narratives asso-
ciated with ideals in different normative domains. We should therefore be
careful not to generalise our results about ideals in one normative domain
to another normative domain. Indeed, a feature of our narrative account
of admiration is that it is able to accommodate the differences between the
various ideals that ground admiration. The trait account attempted to fit
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all normative domains under one model – namely, the loss of traits. The
evaluation pluralist account did slightly better by distinguishing between
the moral and non‐moral domains, but even this is not enough to deal with
the different characteristics of each normative domain.6 This will become
even more clear after we consider our final case, Sell Out Artist, as we will
see differences between the artistic and the athletic as well as connections
between the artistic and the moral.
Sell Out Artist ceases to be admirable for his earlier excellent artworks.
The explanation for this is that he has acted outside the range of narratives
associated with the ideal (i.e., violated the ideal) of being an artist. While
there are many paths that an artist can take to develop herself, we expect
an artist not to come to oppose the content and meaning of her old work.
And we propose that part of acting in line with the range of acceptable nar-
ratives associated with the relevant artistic ideal is not coming to oppose the
content andmeaning of one’s oldwork.Note three things. First, this only ap-
plies to a type of artist that creates artworks that have meaning. Some art
only involves expressions of skill and talent and is thus judged on its formal
features alone. For example, a painting of the countryside or some freeform
jazz need not have anymeaning. This kind of art is similar in kind to athletic
feats. Second, an artist need not approve of the content. Shemay have devel-
oped such that she does not feel the same about her earlier work, but that is
not the same as coming to oppose its content andmeaning. Third, thismeans
that an artist who does not create sell out artworks but who simply changes
her (artistic) character such that she opposes the content and meaning of her
old work is no longer admirable for that work (where this sense of opposition
need not be public or overt or even privately acknowledged by the artist; it
need only be that her values and cares are such that she is opposed to her
old work). When we consider her full history as a particular kind of artist,
she would not be worthy of emulation as that kind of artist, and so she is
now no longer admirable for her earlier work. In short, the fact that she
opposes her old work (in the specific sense we are discussing) is not a good
ending to her story as an artist. It is not the kind of story that will serve as
a good guide for us if we are trying to manifest the relevant artistic ideals.
Our discussion highlights a way in which certain artistic ideals are differ-
ent from athletic ones: it does not matter what an athlete’s stance is towards
her past acts, but it sometimes matters what an artist’s stance is towards her
past work. It also highlights a way in which artistic ideals are similar to
moral ones. Just as Fallen Hero’s story as a moral figure continues, Sell
Out Artist’s story as an artist also continues. And just as we do not want
our artistic hero’s character to change such that she comes to oppose her ear-
lier aesthetically excellent works, we also do not want our moral hero’s char-
acter to change such that she comes to oppose her earlier morally excellent
acts. If a moral hero or an artist changed in this way, she would be a bad
guide to meeting the relevant moral or artistic ideal. So with both Sell Our
ADMIRATION OVER TIME 683
©2020 The Author
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly © 2020 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Artist and Fallen Hero, the actions that defeat their admirability are those
that result in their respective characters changing in key respects.7 These ac-
tions, as well as any subsequent sell out art and immoral actions, are all
defeaters for their earlier admirability for their actions.
4.5. SOLVING THE PUZZLE
We now have an explanation for why our admiration sometimes persists and
sometimes does not.Remaining admirable depends on not violating the ideal
that one manifested in order to become admirable. Fallen Hero violates the
ideal of a social justice campaigner when she replaces her earlier admirable
traits with vicious ones. Athletic Hero does not violate the ideal of a foot-
baller because his later actions are within the acceptable range of narratives
associated with that ideal. While Former War Hero becomes less admirable
than she once was, she remains admirable to some extent because even
though she loses her virtuous traits she does not acquire opposing vicious
traits. Sell Out Artist stops being admirable for his earlier work because he
violates an ideal of an artist when he replaces his admirable artistic traits with
vicious artistic traits. Our account accommodates our judgements about
each of these cases. It also gets the right result in the other cases that we have
discussed. However, our narrative account is not just motivated by getting
the right results in these cases. It is alsomotivated by the connections between
admiration, ideals, narratives and motivation.When we admire a person for
acting a particular way, we desire to emulate them.We do not just try to em-
ulate how she acts at a particular time but how she acts over time. So it not
only matters that she manifests an ideal at a particular time but also how
she subsequently lives with respect to that ideal – that is, it matters that she
lives within the range of acceptable narratives associated with that ideal.
5. Objection: Abandoned ideals
On our account of admiration, a person becomes admirable for an action to
the extent that she manifests an ideal in so acting. A person remains admira-
ble for an action to the extent that she does not violate the ideal. A person
violates an ideal when she acts in ways that are outside the range of narra-
tives associated with that ideal. Our focus thus far has been on providing
an account that solves the puzzle of admiration over time. Of course, ques-
tions remain. In this section, we consider an objection.8
Bob Dylan was a folk musician and a leading figure in the American Folk
Revival in the early 1960s. However, on his 1965 album Bringing it All Back
Home, he ‘went electric’: half the album included songs with an electric
band. This, together with his subsequent electric tour, caused outrage among
some of his fans. Let us suppose that Dylan violated the ideal of a folk
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musician by going electric. Even so, it still seems that Dylan is admirable for
his pre‐electric music. It may therefore seem that our narrative account of
admiration over time cannot accommodate cases like this.
This kind of case provides an opportunity to clarify an important aspect of
our account.While it may be true thatDylan violated the range of narratives
associated with being a folk musician, it is also true that he all along mani-
fested an overarching and more general ideal of a musician, one which
involves developing and transforming over time. We propose that what
makes one ideal (such as that of a folk musician) nested within an overarch-
ing ideal (such as that of a musician) is that the actions that are constitutive
of each ideal converge inmany respects.Most of what differentiates ideals of
being a folk musician with ideals of being a musician are likely the former’s
focus on folk music, perhaps together with commitments and values
concerning certain ways of life, but they will converge on many aspects
related to music in general.
Compare this with Fallen Hero. When she ceases manifesting the ideal of
social justice campaigner, she does not continue to manifest the ideal of a
moral hero. While she manifested that overarching and more general ideal
earlier in life, the kinds of actions she performed that resulted in her ceasing
to live any acceptable narrative associated with ideals of social justice cam-
paigner are also the kinds of actions that would result in her ceasing to live
any acceptable narrative associated with ideals of a moral hero. In other
words, the actions that defeat her admirability for her actions qua social jus-
tice campaigner also serve to defeat her admirability for her actions qua
moral hero. With respect to Dylan, the actions that defeat his admirability
for his music qua folk musician do not defeat his admirability for his music
qua musician.
6. Conclusion
This paper has investigated the fittingness conditions on admiration over
time. We have argued that there is puzzle about admiration over time
because some cases suggest that a person’s admirability for her actions does
not change over time, whereas other cases suggest that a person’s admirabil-
ity for her actions does change over time. We then considered and rejected
both the trait account and the evaluation pluralist account of admiration.
Finally, we outlined our own proposed solution according to which certain
actions act as defeaters to a person’s admirability. On our view, a person
becomes admirable for an action to the extent that she manifests an ideal.
A person remains admirable for an action to the extent that she acts in ways
that do not violate the range of acceptable narratives associated with that
ideal. Defeaters are those actions (or omissions) that violate these acceptable
narratives.
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While we have not discussed moral responsibility and praiseworthiness in
this paper, our arguments have implications for both. At the very least, it
seems that our arguments show that a personmay be praiseworthy forA‐ing
at t1 but then may cease being praiseworthy for A‐ing at t2. For those who
take praiseworthiness to be coextensive with being morally responsible –
such that a personwho ismorally responsible forA‐ing is either praiseworthy
or blameworthy forA‐ing – our arguments also show that we can cease being
morally responsible. This is in line with arguments made by Shoe-
maker (2012) and Andrew Khoury and Benjamin Matheson (2018). How-
ever, our arguments also undermine the positive accounts of responsibility
over time those authors have proposed. They both appeal to versions ofwhat
we called the trait view – that is, the view that explains responsibility over
time in terms of continued possession of the psychological attitudes thatwere
essential to one being responsible in the first place.9 Our cases suggest that re-
sponsibility over time is more complicated than these authors have realised.
While we have only considered cases that touch on praiseworthiness over
time, future investigation might reveal that analogous cases also show that
blameworthiness over time is not as straightforward as these authors suggest.
Finally, while some have investigated the diachronic conditions of respon-
sibility and blameworthiness, most work on emotions has until now focused
on synchronic fittingness conditions.10Given the importance of the emotions
for ourmoral and social lives, this a troubling oversight.We have focused on
admiration in this paper, but we believe that this puzzle may generalise to
other emotions. Going forward, we think that ethicists and philosophers of
emotion must expand their narrow focus on the conditions on becoming a
fitting target of an emotion.Only thenwillwe be closer to an adequate under-
standing of the role and function of the emotions in our lives.11
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1 Unless she had a radical and sudden change of character, this is not compatible with a
plausible account of (numerical) personal identity over time. This is because all such accounts
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must also allow for the possibility of complete change of character over a long enough period.
See Matheson (2019a) and Khoury and Matheson (2018) for further discussion of this point.
2 This account is implicit in Shoemaker (2012, 2015) and Khoury and Matheson (2018).
3 One might question whether this case conflates the aesthetic with the moral. Perhaps it
is the case that Sell Out Artist remains admirable for his earlier work but has failed morally by
pursuing money instead of art. Let us assume that Sell Out Artist has failed morally by pur-
suing money instead of art. While we have argued that someone’s admirability for her art is
often independent of her admirability for her moral actions (Archer and Matheson 2019),
there are at least some cases where this independence does not hold. According to
Bartel (2019), we often find an artwork more aesthetically valuable when we learn about
details of an artist’s life. The struggling artist, for example, may express deeper meaning
and authenticity in her work because of her struggles in life. So, Bartel argues, we should
allow that the artist’s life can negatively affect her work too. Given this, even if Sell Out Artist
has morally failed by creating sell out art, this failure can still affect his aesthetic admirability
for his work. We might also imagine that he needed the money for a morally neutral or praise-
worthy cause. While he would not have done anything morally wrong by selling out, his
admirability for his work ceases.
4 Because we focus on ideals rather than virtues, we avoid making controversial commit-
ments about the nature of the virtues. According to one view of the virtues, possessing a virtue
involves possessing a trait that will manifest itself across a range of different situations, not just
in relation to a particular role (e.g., MacIntyre 2007, p. 205). Similarly, according to the unity of
the virtues thesis, defended by Socrates in Plato’sProtagoras, one cannot possess one virtuewith-
out possessing all the virtues. We do not intend to take a stand on these issues. It is enough for
our purposes that someone can be admirable for an action when she manifests an ideal attached
to a particular role even if she does not count as possessing a virtue in this strong sense.
5 A dissimilarity between our accounts is that while for Velleman the value of a life depends
on how one’s overall life story goes, remaining admirable does not depend on such an overall life
narrative. Rather, it depends on the narratives connected to a particular ideal, which often stem
from social roles. Because a person can have multiple social roles, she can manifest or fail to
manifest several ideals at once.
6 Ideals within one normative domain may also differ from other ideals in that domain, so
we may also need to be careful about generalising from one case (e.g., a social justice cam-
paigner) to another (e.g., a war hero). We will set aside this point in what follows.
7 We do not take a stand onwhether the change occurs prior to or simultaneously with their
later acts (creating sell out art or acting immorally).
8 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing us to consider this kind of case.
9 The puzzle also seems to cut against the narrative view of responsibility over time sug-
gested by Matheson (2014, 2019b).
10 For an exception, see Na’aman (forthcoming).
11 Thanks to audiences at the Stockholm Summer Workshop in 2018 and the Sixth Annual
OZSW Conference at the University of Twente. For written comments, thanks to Robert
Hartman, Andrew Khoury, JennyMcKay and Huub Brouwer. Thanks especially to two anon-
ymous referees for this journal. This workwas supported by theNWO (NederlandseOrganisatie
voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek; The Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research;
Grant Numbers 016.Veni.174.104 and 040.11.614) and the Alexander von Humboldt Founda-
tion (Alexander von Humboldt‐Stiftung).
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